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Abstract—The paper presents a practical implementation of
the non-classified data hiding system (NDHS) understood as
a military platform for information warfare that takes advan-
tage of the hidden data transmission for voice connections in
order to gain informational lead over a potential enemy. The
NDHS performs here as a botnet network that is managed
by the hidden transmission controller referred to as the mas-
ter resident. Research studies are dedicated to investigation
of various connections in heterogeneous links as well as func-
tionalities of such components as hidden protocol bridges and
the master resident.
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1. Introduction
Telecom IT networks present an important component of
the contemporary telecom world. Safeguarded circulation
of information with its continuous supervision pose sub-
stantial challenges for contemporary science. From the mil-
itary point any attack to the national IT network (along with
the entire telecom infrastructure) is the ﬁrst step to initial
warfare actions. In case of public IT networks one has to be
aware that such networks may be used as reserved commu-
nication means between military troops to substitute, when
necessary, commonly used communication means operated
regularly by the army. Total destruction of public IT net-
works is extremely diﬃcult as these networks are really
extensive and incorporate great number of protecting mea-
sures to preserve their integrity when one or several their
components are disrupted.
Beside cryptographic methods the safeguarding measures
use also techniques of information hiding that are comple-
mentary to cryptographic ones.
This paper deals with the mechanism of the master resi-
dent (MR), the possibility to remote control network de-
vices using hidden layer and implementation of those con-
cepts. As stated in [1] “Network Management normally has
4 components: The component that supervises (...); The
component that is supervised (...); A protocol that trans-
fers the information between the agent and the server. (...);
A list of possible things to manage”. In non-classiﬁed data
hiding system (NDHS) the component that supervises is
the master resident, components that are supervised are
hidden protocol interpreters (HPI), simple protocol used to
communicate between master resident and hidden proto-
col interpreters is transmitted over hidden layer and allows
to send commands to HPIs thus NDHS is network man-
agement mechanism that is designed to work on hidden
networks.
The master resident makes it possible to control hetero-
geneous IT networks using hidden and conﬁdential trans-
mission of commands and data that takes advantage of the
digital watermark technology and encoding with use of the
variably modiﬁed permutation composition (VMPC) key
scheduling algorithm (KSA) [2]. That mechanism is a part
of the NDHS [3], [4]. NDHS can be classiﬁed as the mech-
anism of electronic defence (ED) [5], [6] and uses infor-
mation hiding techniques to transmit information between
NDHS functional elements (hidden protocol interpreter
and master resident) [3], [7] and allows the NDHS operator
to remote control every hidden protocol interpreter using
commands transmitted in hidden layer. In case of a hos-
tile conﬂict such a mechanism, if widely applied in public
networks, makes it possible to take control over selected
components of public IT networks and then continuous op-
eration of the overall telecom systems is conducive to gain
an informational lead.
The remaining part of the paper is structured in the follow-
ing way: the second part presents the historical solutions
that have been developed so far related to the issues of mak-
ing the information hidden whilst the third part describes
the mechanism to be implemented. Finally, the fourth part
outlines how the intended mechanism was implemented.
2. Related Works
Continuously more and more research eﬀorts of scientiﬁc
circles are targeted to the application opportunities of hid-
den transmissions via IT network. The past interest was
focused on data transmission itself via individual segments
of the network. Some examples of proposed solutions
can be found in studies [8]–[11], where stress is put onto
hidden transmission exclusively by one type of channels.
Some attempts towards application of hidden transmission
were undertaken in studies related to: the steganographic
router [12] as well as to the system for hidden transmis-
sion of information [4]. There are also other solutions that
can be used for authentication procedures in networks. For
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wireless networks to IEEE 802.11 such a mechanism is de-
scribed in [13]. A similar mechanism is also applied to RF
communication within the VHF bandwidth [14], [15].
The mechanism that is outlined in this paper combines var-
ious approaches to the issues how to apply hidden transmis-
sion to manage IT networks and was purposefully designed
thus it would be operated in a heterogeneous environment
and use the hidden layer to supervise the network infras-
tructure which is the unique feature.
3. Mechanism Description
Operation principle of the mechanism is based on use of
voice transmission (phone conversation). Transmission of
voice signals is carried out with use of various technologies:
voice over IP (VoIP), phone calls within public switched
telephone networks (PSTN) as well as connections with
use of a military VHF radio stations.
The transmitted voice signal is considered as the transport
layer for the binary signature of the watermark. Boundary
components of the network (take-over points) that switch
voice signals to subscribers can be furnished with suitable
software HPI [3], [7] that make it possible to carry out
actions on those components in remote manner. Remote
commands with instructions to initiate required actions can
be transmitted in a hidden manner by means of the voice
signal.
The research studies employed three options of voice sig-
nals: male speech in English (track no. 1), male speech in
German (track no. 2) as well as pop music (track no. 3).
The watermarked records that had been processed with use
of one of the two following methods: orthogonal frequency-
division multiplexing (OFDM) [16] with its information
capacity P = 21 bits as well as the method of drift correc-
tion modulation (DCM) [17] with two options of data pay-
load P = 84 and P = 147 bits. Parameters of the records
were the following: sampling frequency fS = 48000 Hz,
16 bits per sample, mono mode.
3.1. Examination of Transmission Channels
In order to carry out the experiments it was necessary to
examine individual transmission channels. The test con-
sisted in transmission of a voice signal with an embedded
digital watermark with further reception of the signal and
recording it at the other end of the network segment. The
recorded signal was then delivered to the watermark ex-
tractor where the binary signature of the watermark was
obtained at the extractor output. In addition the binary sig-
nature bit error rate (BSBER – bit error rate of the binary
signature embeded in watermark) was determined for the
extracted binary signature of the watermark. The examina-
tion procedure covered the following types of transmission
channels: RF channel of the NDHS-WiFi type where the
voice signal was transmitted as VoIP phone call, PSTN
telephone line as well as VHF radio channel. The aim of
tests the performed tests was to ﬁnd out whether a hid-
den transmission is feasible via such channels and to se-
lect optimum transmission parameters. Figure 1 presents
Fig. 1. Measurement results for the binary signature bit error
rate when the OFDM method was used.
results for measurements of the bit error rate for the digi-
tal signature of transmitted watermarked tracks for signals
determined with use of the OFDM method, transmitted
via RF channels of the NDHS WiFi type as well as via
a PSTN channel. Figure 2 shows corresponding results for
Fig. 2. Measurement results for the bit error rate when the DCM
method was used (P = 84 bits).
Fig. 3. Measurement results for the binary signature bit error
rate when the DCM method was used (P = 147 bits).
12
Network Management in Non-classiﬁed Data Hiding System Using Master Resident over Hidden Layer
signals where watermarks had been embedded with use
of the DCM method and with the watermark data pay-
load P = 84 bits. Similarly, Fig. 3 presents results for the
DCM method and information capacity P = 147 bits. The
analysis covered 30 seconds of a signal recorded at the
other end of the examined transmission channel. The test
demonstrated that the DCM method is less vulnerable to
degradation of voice signals introduced by the IT networks
under tests.
3.2. Examination of Bridges
For needs of the experiments the term of hidden proto-
col bridge (HPB) was introduced. The bridge is a hard-
ware or software unit that is capable to handle the water-
mark embedded into a voice signal and to forward it be-
tween transmission channels of diﬀerent types. Two bridge
types were distinguished, i.e., the hardware bridge HPB-H
that is incapable to process hidden information and merely
forwards voice signals as well as the software bridge
HPB-S that extracts binary signatures from voice signals
transmitted via networks and uses corrective code extractors
to recover information represented by the signatures. For
that purpose two types of extractors can be used: the BCH
type in case of the DCM method or the Reed-Solomon (RS)
type when the OFDM method is used. Finally, the re-
covered information is recoded back into the watermark
of the voice signal that is forwarded to that second net-
work. In that way information to be forwarded in the hid-
den layer is refreshed. The completed experiments involved
the following corrective codes: the BCH type (n = 84,
k = 28, t = 7), where n – length of the code vector, k
– length of the information vector and t – correction ca-
pacity of the code, another BCH type (n = 147, k = 91,
t = 7) as well as the Reed-Solomon (RS) type (n = 21,
k = 9, t = 3).
Fig. 4. General diagram of the hardware bridge HPB-H.
Figures 4 and 5 present general diagrams for individual
bridge types. The following types of bridges were set
up for the experiments: PSTN-NDHS WiFi as well as
VHF-NDHS WiFi. Investigation of bridges included ver-
iﬁcation of their information bit error rates (IBER) for
information recovered from the BCH and RS extractors.
The calculated error rate served as the criterion to assess
whether hidden transmission of commands to boundary ap-
pliances is possible or not.
Figure 6 presents measurement results for the bit error
rate calculated for the hidden information (a control com-
mand) recovered from BCH and RS extractors for the hard-
ware bridge PSTN-NDHS WiFi. One can clearly see that
path no. 3 (pop music) is incapable to eﬃciently transmit
control commands via such a bridge. In other cases correc-
tive codes could recover the original form of information.
Similar results were obtained for the software bridge (with
information refreshment) of the PSTN-NDHS WiFi type.
The obtained results can be seen in Fig. 7.
Experiment results for the software bridge VHF-NDHS
WiFi are shown in Fig. 8. The graph contains only those
paths that were substantially deteriorated so that extrac-
tion of the watermark binary signature proved infeasible.
The next picture (Fig. 9) presents measurements results
for the hardware implementation of the VHF-NDHS WiFi
bridge. In such a case the OFDM method proved inca-
pable to extract the watermark binary signature. On the
other hand, the second path (male speech in German) with
the watermark embedded by means of the DCM method
proved suﬃciently invulnerable to transmission degrada-
tion factors and recovery of the original command was
possible.
3.3. Collaboration between Master Resident and Hidden
Protocol Interpreter
The master resident is a speciﬁc component of the NDHS
system as it is intended to supervise operation of individ-
ual stations that make up components of a hidden network
(botnet) as it is the station where hidden protocol inter-
preters are installed. The hidden protocol interpreter en-
hances the forwarding station (router) with the functional-
ity of a network-centric router [12]. The HPI unit analyzes
streams of voice packages that pass through the speciﬁc
router with the aim to detect hidden transmission or embeds
a watermark into the forwarded voice signal. The master
resident communicates with HPI units operated within the
existing network in a hidden or open manner (depending on
available possibilities and importance of information trans-
mitted). The master resident makes the decision on the
basis of information about data streams forwarded by every
speciﬁc HPI unit and provides that HPI unit with relevant
commands. The commands are always encrypted with use
of the symmetric VMPC code. Encryption keys that are
used to encode communication sessions between MR and
HPI are stored in the MR database (repository) and are
unique for each speciﬁc HPI unit. After receiving the com-
mand the HPI unit undertakes the required action. There
are many possible actions, starting from simple recording
of the voice signals through modiﬁcation of these signals
(injection of an additional content or extraction of some
fragments of the voice package) up to disabling the entire
voice signal or forwarding the latter to another subscriber.
In extreme cases the entire components of the network in-
frastructure where the speciﬁc HPI is installed can be elim-
inated or some functions attributable to these components
can be disabled.
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Fig. 5. General diagram of the software bridge HPB-S.
Fig. 6. Results for measurements of information bit error rates
(IBER) for information recovered from the PSTN-NDHS WiFi
bridge implemented as HPB-H.
Fig. 7. Results for measurements of information bit error rates
(IBER) for information recovered from the software bridge PSTN-
NDHS WiFi.
Fig. 8. Results for measurements of information bit error rates
(IBER) for information recovered from the software bridge VHF-
NDHS WiFi.
Fig. 9. Results for measurements of information bit error rates
(IBER) for information recovered from the hardware bridge VHF-
NDHS WiFi.
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4. Implementation of the Mechanism
The described mechanism was implemented in practice on
the basis of the GNU/Linux operating system. HPI units
were developed as kernel modules whilst the MR repre-
sented an independent application developed in C program-
ming language.
To conﬁrm operability of the mechanism two hardware
bridges were set up, namely VHF-NDHS WiFi as well
as PSTN-VHF (in that way a heterogeneous network was
developed) where two HPI were operated. The network
layout with the established bridges is shown in Fig. 10.
Fig. 10. Diagram of examined heterogeneous network (PSTN-
VHF-NDHS WiFi).
The network was used to transmit voice packages with
embedded watermarks equivalent to encrypted commands.
The record no. 2 was selected for experiments (male speech
in German) with the watermarks embedded with use of the
DCM method (where the both information capacities were
applied). The command was encrypted and then encoded
with use of the BCH code. HPI units, after having the com-
mand decoded and decrypted, were forced to perform the
speciﬁc operation, namely to have the voice message “con-
versation monitored, conversation monitored” introduced
into the voice package transmitted between terminal 1 and
terminal 2. The completed experiments conﬁrmed the as-
sumption that IT networks can be managed with use of
hidden and conﬁdential information transmitted via hetero-
geneous environment with use of HPI units, the master
resident and HPB.
5. Conclusion
Nowadays none of the voice telephone systems (VoIP,
PSTN, GSM) fails to be invulnerable to hidden transmis-
sion, which enables wide application of hidden transmis-
sion systems similar to the described one. Therefore there is
the potential risk that the unauthorized hidden transmission
shall be used to control components of network infrastruc-
tures. Consequently, development of mechanisms intended
to safeguard the network against such an unintended use is
an urgent must.
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